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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal was properly before the Supreme Court tinder Utah Code Ann. § 78A3-102(3)0) (2008). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4), the Utah Supreme
Court transferred the case to this Court on November 3, 2008. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues presented on appeal:
1. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees
Jonathan Lowry and Nathan Kinsella on March 21, 2006, by determining that Appellees
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Appellant's claims against Kinsella
and all but one part of one of Appellant's claims against Lowry?
Standard of review: "Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment presents a
question of law, and [appellate courts] grant no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions and review them for correctness. Yet, c[a] trial court has broad discretion, to
admit or exclude evidence and its determination typically will only be disturbed if it
constitutes an abuse of discretion.'" Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&GEng'g, Inc., 2008 UT
App 29, If 7, 177 P.3d 644 (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, t 20, 989 P.2d 52)
(further citations omitted). [R. 1691-1703; 2020-22.]
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee
Jonathan Lowry, on October 8, 2008, by determining that Appellee Lowry was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on Appellant's one remaining claim against Lowry?
Standard of review: "Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment presents a
4836-4530-5603:1X3001.004
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question of law, and [appellate courts] grant no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions and review them for correctness. Yet, '[a] trial court has broad discretion to
admit or exclude evidence and its determination typically will only be disturbed if it
constitutes an abuse of discretion.'" Sunridge Dev. Corp,, 2008 UT App 29 at T|7? 177
P.3d 644 (quoting Whittle, 1999 UT 96, at f20, 989 P.2d 52) (further citations omitted).
[R. 2378-85.]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed by Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. ("J&T

Marketing" or "Appellant") on August 29, 2002. [R. 49.] The original complaint named
Financial Development Services, Inc. ("FDS"), Jeremy Warburton, and John Neubauer, as
defendants and contained six causes of action. [R. 39-49.] All of J&T Marketing's claims
against these defendants arose out of or were related to a Sales and Marketing Agreement
("Agreement") entered into between FDS and J&T Marketing and made effective as of
January 31, 2002. [R. 33-37.] (A copy of the Agreement is included in the Addendum
hereto at Tab A.) Pursuant to the Agreement, J&T Marketing supplied FDS with the
names, addresses and phone numbers of sales leads, and FDS marketed and sold Ted
Thomas Courses through telemarketing and other sales efforts. [R. 1702.]
On May 6, 2004, the trial court granted J&T Marketing leave to amend its
complaint and allege claims against Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella (collectively
"Appellees") individually. [R. 994-996.] J&T Marketing filed its Amended Complaint
on June 18, 2004, alleging nine cause of action: breach of contract, theft by conversion,
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, accounting,
injunctive relief, constructive fraud, fraudulent non-disclosure, and intentional
interference with business relations.1 [R. 1027-44.] Five of these causes of action
alleged tort claims against both Appellees individually and others, including FDS. [See
id.]
II.

Proceedings Below
On May 20, 2005, Appellees Lowry and Kinsella filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment, requesting summary judgment on J&T Marketing's second, third, seventh,
eighth, and ninth causes of action as they applied to Lowry and Kinsella, i.e. all of the
causes of action that contained tort allegations against them.2 [R. 1198-1200.] Opposing
Appellees' motion, J&T Marketing relied heavily upon statements made by John
Neubauer in a deposition taken in Mr. Neubauer's separate bankruptcy proceeding.3 [R.

1

The trial court denied J&T Marketing's Modified Motion to Amend Complaint as it
pertained to two new causes of action alleging civil liability for violations of Utah's
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act and the federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act. [R. 995.] J&T Marketing subsequently filed a Modified Motion for
Leave to File Amended Complaint seeking to add an additional cause of action alleging
conspiracy, [R. 886-87], but the trial court denied this motion in its entirety, [R. 101517]. Despite these rulings by the trial court, J&T Marketing attempted to raise factual
issues in its summary judgment motions by referencing these invalid claims. See
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan
Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment at vii (claiming that Lowry and Kinsella had
"omitted Jones's conspiracy cause of action"). [R. 1315.]
2

J&T Marketing's First, Fourth, and Fifth causes of action were brought only against
FDS. [R. 1034-35, 1031-32.] J&T Marketing's Sixth cause of action was brought against
Lowry, Kinsella, Jeremy Warburton, FDS and Esbex and dealt with injunctive relief. [R.
1030-31.]
3

J&T Marketing also relied upon the Affidavit of Chad Jenkins.

4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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[R. 1309-10.]

1292-1322.] Appellees Lowry and Kinsella objected to J&T Marketing's submission of
Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition and moved to have it stricken from the record. [R.
1570-1571.] At the hearing held to consider Lowry and Kinsella's motions, the trial court
granted Appellees' motion to strike the deposition4 but allowed J&T Marketing
additional time to conduct a new deposition of Mr. Neubauer. [R. 1629.] The trial court
ordered that after participating in this new deposition, supplemental briefs could be filed
by each party. [R. 1629, 1635-37.]
J&T Marketing took the deposition of Mr. Neubauer on October 18, 2005, and
supplemental briefs then were filed by both parties whereupon the trial court granted
Appellees' motion in part. [R. 1691-1703] In its Ruling Granting In Part Defendants
Lowry and Kinsella Js Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on February 1, 2006- (a
copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab B), the trial court granted
complete summary judgment to Appellees Lowry and Kinsella on the second, seventh,
eighth, and ninth causes of action of the Amended Complaint. [R. 1691-97.] With
respect to J&T Marketing's one remaining cause of action, i.e., the third cause of action
However, portions of Mr. Jenkins's affidavit relied on by J&T Marketing had expressly
been stricken by the trial court on May 6, 2004. [R. 995-96.]
4

Lowry and Kinsella moved to strike Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition because
they did not have notice of or attend the deposition, as required by Rule 32(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because the portions relied on by J&T Marketing lacked
foundation, were irrelevant, or were speculative and misleading. [R. 1577-83.] The trial
court granted this motion on September 22, 2005. [R. 1629.] It was within the discretion
of the trial court to exclude the bankruptcy proceeding testimony while granting J&T
Marketing additional time to take Mr. Neubauer's deposition in this case. See Whittle,
1999 UT 96 at f20. J&T Marketing has not appealed the trial court's decision to strike
Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition, and it cannot now support any factual allegations
by relying on that stricken deposition testimony.
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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claiming fraudulent misrepresentation, however, the trial court granted complete
summary judgment as to Defendant Kinsella but only partial summary judgment as to
Defendant Lowry. Regarding one written statement allegedly made by Lowry, the trial
court explained that u[d]rawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the
Court denies Defendant Lowry's motion for summary judgment as to this claim.5' [R.
1692 (emphasis added).] The ruling granting summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella
except as to this claim and issue was later summarized in the trial court's Order on
Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on March 21,
2006 ("2006 Order") (a copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab C). [R.
2021.]
Following the entry of the Order on March 21, 2006, confirming the trial court's
February 1, 2006 ruling, J&T Marketing took no immediate action to pursue the lingering
claim against Appellee Lowry upon which the trial court refused to grant summary
judgment. J&T Marketing, however, did obtain a default judgment against Defendants
FDS and Exbex.com on September 13, 2007, resolving its claims against those two
defendants. [R. 2215-17.] The September 13, 2007 default judgment did not in any way
address J&T Marketing's remaining claim against Appellee Lowry for fraudulent
misrepresentation.
On October 5, 2007, J&T Marketing filed a Notice of Appeal, seeking review of
the trial court's 2006 Order. [R. 2225.] However, after Appellees argued that the matter
was not ripe for appeal, J&T Marketing voluntarily dismissed its appeal, [R. 2246], and
the matter was remitted to the trial court [R. 2251], Lowry filed a summary judgment
4836-4530-5603;LO001.004
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motion on J&T Marketing's remaining fraudulent misrepresentation claim on June 23,
2008 [R. 2272-85]. Exercising its discretion to re-examine the remaining claim of
fraudulent misrepresentation against Lowry, the trial court granted summary judgment to
Lowry on the remaining fraudulent misrepresentation claim on October 8, 2008. [R.
2378-85] (a copy of the Order Granting Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry's Motion for
Summary Judgment ("2008 Order") is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab D). J&T
Marketing appealed the 2006 Order and the 2008 Order on October 16,2008.
III.

Statement of Undisputed Facts5
J&T Marketing's claims arise out of performance under a contract between FDS

and J&T Marketing entered into in February 2002, which allowed FDS to selF J&T
Marketing's Ted Thomas Courses. [R. 33-37, 1320.] Pursuant to the contract, J&T
Marketing supplied FDS with the names, addresses and phone numbers of sales leads,

5

J&T Marketing's citations to the record in its Statement of Facts of the Brief of
Appellant do not appear to correspond to pages in the record that actually support the
stated facts. Indeed, some of the citations actually refer to J&T Marketing's argument
section of its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry arid Nathan
Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 1293-1308.] J&T Marketing's
Memorandum relies heavily upon the bankruptcy deposition of John Neubauer, which the
trial court specifically struck from the record in its entirety, finding it reliable only to the
extent it was corroborated by Mr. Neubauer's October 18, 2005 deposition. [R. 1695.]
J&T Marketing's Statement of Facts also apparently intended to cite to Mr. Neubauer's
October 18, 2005 deposition, portions of which were attached to its Supplemental
Memorandum. [R. 1640-49.] However, J&T Marketing's citations do not correspond to
the actual pages of Mr. Neubauer's new deposition or to evidence that would create
disputed material facts regarding Lowry and Kinsella's liability. In addition to this
citation problem, Lowry and Kinsella note that Mr. Neubauer's new deposition testimony
demonstrates serious foundational flaws. Mr. Neubauer stated several times that he can
no longer recollect much concerning the day-to-day business of FDS or Esbex. [R. 1641,
1645, 1668, 1682.] Thus, J&T Marketing's citations to the record fail to support the facts
alleged in its Statement of Facts.
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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and FDS marketed and sold the courses and remitted to J&T Marketing a portion of the
sales proceeds. [R. 1320.] The contract provided that FDS could enroll purchasers of the
Ted Thomas Courses in FDS's own program to provide coaching services for $99 per
month on its own account. [R. at 1701.] Approximately five and a half months after
entering into the contract, i.e., on July 19, 2002, FDS cancelled the contract and informed
J&T Marketing that J&T Marketing was in breach of contract based upon its failure to
supply the Ted Thomas Courses to customers after FDS had made sales. [R. 1316,
1598.] In reaction to FDS's cancellation, J&T Marketing filed its original complaint
against FDS and others on August 29, 2002. [R. 1316.] J&T Marketing subsequently
amended its complaint alleging that Lowry and Kinsella should be held personally liable
for certain actions related to the contract between FDS and J&T Marketing. [R. 131546.]
The putative reasons that J&T Marketing delayed or halted some shipments of its
Ted Thomas Courses included the following: J&T Marketing would delay shipment of
the product if FDS's payment was delayed; J&T Marketing employed temporary
shipping clerks to do product shipment, which resulted in staff turnover and ongoing
training and supervision issues; and J&T Marketing finally ceased shipping Ted Thomas
Courses altogether due to a contract dispute with FDS over payment issues. [R. 1317.]
A third entity, Esbex.com, Inc. ("Esbex") while not providing Ted Thomas Courses per
se, provided coaching/mentoring services for a monthly fee to some purchasers of the
Ted Thomas Courses. [R. 1319.] One of the payment issues was whether a percentage
of the fees was owed to J&T Marketing on such coaching services.

When J&T

Marketing failed to ship product to FDS, FDS filled some orders by shipping products

4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
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that had been returned by other clients because it "was trying to fulfill to make people
happy and prevent a refund or cancellation." [R. 1647, Deposition of John Neubauer
(dated October 18, 2005) ("Neubauer Dep.") 16:4-14.] In addition, although J&T
Marketing asserts that FDS and Esbex should have split coaching fees under the contract,
the only evidence presented to the trial court was that FDS believed that the coaching
fees were not covered by the contract and were not to be shared with J&T Marketing. [R.
1644, Neubauer Dep. 26:10 to 28:12.]
In its Amended Complaint, J&T Marketing asserted that Lowry individually and
fraudulently misrepresented that FDS would stop selling Ted Thomas products, and the
trial court initially denied Lowry summary judgment on this issue. [R. 1692.] However,
Lowry gave instructions riot to sell Ted Thomas products, and that he never rescinded
this instruction. [R 2286, 2289-91, 2292, 2308, 2381.] Lowry did not authorize any
transaction involving the sale of a Ted Thomas product or any contact with a Ted
Thomas lead after July 19, 2002. [R. 2307.] No evidence was submitted by J&T
Marketing to demonstrate that that Lowry or Kinsella individually hid evidence of sales
of Ted Thomas products after July 19, 2002. [R. 2381.]
Lowry and Kinsella were shareholders, officers and directors of FDS and Esbex.
[R. 1318, 1916.] John Neubauer was the Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of FDS, and both FDS and Esbex used Mr. Neubauer to perform their accounting.
[R. 1598, 1917.] Mr. Neubauer was FDS's principal agent in dealing with J&T
Marketing, and all communication with J&T marketing went through Mr. Neubauer. [R.
1318-19, 1916-17.] In his deposition taken in this case on October 18, 2005, Mr.
4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
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Neubauer testified that FDS and Esbex were legitimate companies, stating that he
"wouldn't have worked there if [he] didn't feel that way." [R. 1640, Neubauer Dep. 42:411.] Mr. Neubauer also testified that while Lowry and Kinsella took money from the
business, he does not remember exactly how the money was accounted for, but he did
specifically recall that as chief financial officer he accounted for and kept track of such
withdrawals. [R. 1641, Neubauer Dep. 40:3-14.] The only evidence in the record is to the
effect that FDS and Esbex followed corporate formalities. [R. 1196.] There is no
evidence or submission presented to the trial court that Appellees Lowry or Kinsella coiningled funds or acted outside of the scope of their corporate responsibilities at any time
relevant to this matter. Further, J&T Marketing failed to present evidence that would
support a conclusion that Lowry or Kinsella are or should be held personally liable for
the alleged tort actions of conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud,
fraudulent misrepresentation, or intentional interference with contractual relations alleged
against them. [R. 1691-94.]
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
J&T Marketing specifically appeals an order entered by the trial court on March
21, 2006, granting Lowry and Kinsella's motion for summary judgment on all but one
portion of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim against Lowry. J&T Marketing also
appeals from the order entered by the trial court on October 8, 2008, wherein Lowry was
granted summary judgment on that one remaining fraudulent misrepresentation claim.
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should uphold the trial court's decision
to grant Lowry and Kinsella5s motions for summary judgment. On a motion for summary
4836-4530-5603X0001.004
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judgment, "the non-moving party has an obligation to come forward with sufficient proof
to show that the non-moving party is entitled to proceed to trial." In re Discipline of
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, \ 41, 86 P.3d 712. In the matter before this Court, J&T
Marketing failed to present evidence before the trial court that would have supported a
conclusion that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding J&T Marketing's alter
ego theory claims.
The alter ego theory only arises if both factors of a two prong test are shown: (1)
that there is a unity of interest or ownership between the individual and the corporation,
and (2) that maintaining the corporate form would sanction fraud, promote injustice or
create an inequitable result. See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57; f
36, 84P.3d 1154. J&T Marketing failed to present evidence establishing genuine issues of
material fact regarding either of these two prongs.
In addition, J&T Marketing utterly failed to present evidence that would support a
conclusion of genuine issues of fact on any element of its claims for personal liability
against Lowly and Kinsella. On the other hand, the undisputed evidence demonstrates
that neither Lowry nor Kinsella are personally liable for any of J&T Marketing's alleged
injuries arising out of its contractual agreement with FDS. J&T Marketing did not
present evidence to establish essential elements of its claims against Lowry and Kinsella
for Theft by Conversion, Constructive Fraud, Fraudulent Nondisclosure, Intentional
Interference with Contractual Relations, or Fraudulent Misrepresentation. Instead, the
undisputed facts demonstrated that Lowry and Kinsella did not personally contribute to
any damages allegedly sustained by J&T Marketing. The trial court correctly ruled that
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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there were no material issues of fact on the issue of summary judgment and correctly
granted Lowry and Kinsella summary judgment as a matter of law.
In addition to these arguments, the trial court's decision to grant them summary
judgment may also be upheld under the economic loss rule. The economic loss rule
marks the boundary between contract and tort law. In this case, J&T Marketing allege
facts to support breach of the contract between itself and FDS. On these same facts, J&T
Marketing alleges tort claims against Lowry and Kinsella individually. Under Utah law,
a party suffering only economic damages arising out of breach of an express contract may
not also assert a tort claim for the same action absent an independent duty of care. See
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ^|16, 48 P.3d 235. J&T Marketing sought damages
arising out of the alleged breach of contract. J&T Marketing's contractual damages are
the root for its alleged tort damages. [R 1028-35.] Further, J&T Marketing identified no
independent duty outside of the contract. Therefore the economic loss rule should also
apply to prohibit J&T Marketing from maintaining is five tort causes of action against
Lowry and Kinsella.
ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW, THE TRIAL
COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF LOWRY AND KINSELLA ON J&T MARKETING'S CLAIMS
BECAUSE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT WERE
ESTABLISHED,
This Court should affirm the trial court's 2006 Order and 2008 Order and deny

J&T Marketing's appeal. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that
summary judgment may be obtained "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
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interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). It is also well established that:
[o]nce the allegations in a complaint are challenged, the non-moving party
has an obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to show that the
non-moving party is entitled to proceed to trial. It is not enough to rest on
allegations dons, particularly when the parties have had an opportunity for
discovery.
In re Discipline ofSonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, % 41, 86 P.3d 712 (emphasis added).
J&T Marketing erroneously urges this Court to conduct a single inquiry into
whether there are disputes of material facts and cites to the 1995 case of Draper City v.
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995), for the proposition that it is not required
to prove all the elements of its claims against Lowry arid Kinsella. This is not, however,
the standard to which plaintiffs are held. The Utah Supreme Court held in Gerbich v.
Numedlnc, 1999 UT 37, f 12, 977 P.2d 1205, Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327,
339 (Utah 1997), and Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3 at |41, that while the moving party must
show that there is no material issue of fact, "in opposing a motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving all the elements of his or her cause of
action." Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37 at %\2 (quoting Jensen, 944 P.2d at 339); accord
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3 at fU.
Appellees acknowledge that "a trial court should not weigh disputed evidence, and
its sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist." Estate of Bernardo, 888
P.2d at 1100. However, when contending against a motion for summary judgment, a
plaintiff, having the burden of proof, "has the obligation to come forward with sufficient
4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
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proof to show that [it is] entitled to proceed to trial." Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37 at % 12.
Evidence is sufficient when it raises "a genuine issue of fact." Klienert v. Kimball
Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct App. 1993). When the plaintiff as the nonmoving party does not submit evidence to support an element of its claim, the trial court
should grant summary judgment on that claim.
Utah court decisions on this standard are consistent with United States Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the federal equivalent of Utah5 s Rule 56.
When a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case . . . there can be 'no genuine
issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning
an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all;
other facts immaterial." Thus, the standard for summary judgment "mirrors
the standard for a directed verdict," in that a moving party, who has
otherwise made its case,, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law wherfe
the "nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of
proof."
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Utah Ct App. 1994) (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)
and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986))). Since J&T Marketing
did not set forth facts sufficient to establish the existence of essential elements of its
claims against Lowry and Kinsella, the trial court properly concluded that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact and properly granted summary judgment against
J&T Marketing. See Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^23, 116 P.3d 323.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON J&T MARKETING'S ALTER EGO CLAIMS.
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella on
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J&T Marketing's alter ego theory because there were no genuine issues of material fact
making summary judgment appropriate as a matter of law.6 In Utah "a corporation is
regarded as a legal entity, separate and apart from its stockholders." Dockstader v.
Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973); accord Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "In so immunizing corporate
directors from personal liability, the law has proceeded on the theory that in so acting
they are but the agents of the corporation and that the breach is that of the corporation,
and hence it alone is answerable therefore [sic]." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577,
582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted). Utah Courts "have stated
that '[c]ourts must balance piercing and insulating policies and [should] only reluctantly
and cautiously pierce the corporate veil.'" Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d
42,46(UtahCt.App.l988)).
Two elements must exist for a court to pierce the coiporate veil. "The corporate
form may be disregarded when there is csuch unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist . . . and the
observance of the coiporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an
inequitable result would follow.'" Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57,
t 36, 84 P.3d 1154 (quoting Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028,

6

J&T Marketing did not expressly assert an alter ego theory in its Amended Complaint.
However, J&T Marketing did raise the alter ego doctrine in its Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella 's Motion for Summary
Judgment. [R. 1321.]
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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1030 (Utah 1979)). J&T Marketing claims that it presented "enough disputed facts" on
the corporate veil issue to overcome Lowry and Kinsella's motion for summary
judgment. Brief'of*Appellant at 12. The record shows otherwise.
A.

J&T Marketing Did Not Provide Sufficient Evidence to Support the
Unity of Interest Prong of the Alter Ego Theory.

J&T Marketing's claims boil down to a contract dispute between itself and FDS,
and all of J&T Marketing's allegations regarding fraud and misrepresentation rest solely
on its unilateral interpretation of the contract terms. Iii Utah, factors have been identified
that guide a determination of whether the unity-of-interest prong has been violated.
These factors include the following:
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe
corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of
corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunctioning of other
officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder of
stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice
or fraud.
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct App. 1987).
As J&T Marketing noted in its brief, Utah courts have stated that "[fjailure to
distinguish between corporate and personal property, the use of corporate funds to pay
personal expenses without proper accounting, and failure to maintain complete corporate
and financial records are looked upon with extreme disfavor." Colman, 143 P.2d at 786
n.3. J&T Marketing has presented no evidence, however, that Lowry or Kinsella failed to
distinguish their funds from the corporation's, that they commingled corporate funds with
their own, or that they failed to keep proper records. On the contrary, Lowry and
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Kinsella presented undisputed evidence that FDS and Esbex actually maintained
corporate formalities. [R. 1196.]
J&T Marketing would have this Court find the unity of interest prong satisfied by
evidence that Lowry and Kinsella took money from the corporation for their personal use.
See Brief of Appellee at 14.7 J&T Marketing suggests that the mere fact that Lowry and
Kinsella were distributed money out of the corporation, standing alone, raises a genuine
issue of material fact concerning the unity of interest prong of the alter ego theory. See
id. But, J&T presented no evidence that any such disbursement represented improper
siphoning of the corporation's funds, that the disbursements were not properly and
separately accounted for on the records of the corporation, of that the corporation^ funds
were co-mingled with those of these shareholders. Mr. Neubauer testified that he, as the.
CFO of FDS and Esbex accounted for the money withdrawn by Lowry and Kinsella as
instructed. [R. 1641, Neubauer Dep. 40:8-14.] It would be hard to find a successful
corporation that did not provide funds to its shareholders, In addition, Mr. Neubauer
testified that Lowry and Kinsella instructed him to "find a way to free up expenses aiid
free up cash flow" to provide refunds to customers. [R. 1644; Neubauer Dep. 25:7-23.]
Mr. Neubauer5 s testimony as the CFO of FDS and Esbex was that he prepared the
J&T Marketing's citations to the record here do not align with actual pages in the record
containing any alleged evidence supporting its claims. To the extent J&T Marketing's
citations refer to portions of its original Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants
Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella Js Motion for Summary Judgment that rely on the
bankruptcy declaration of Mr. Neubauer, the citations provide no support since the trial
court struck Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition in its entirety and held that it could
only be relied upon to the extent it was corroborated by his October 18, 2005 deposition
testimony. [R. 1695.] J&T Marketing has not appealed the trial court's decision on that
issue.
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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financial records including monthly income statements and net profit and loss statements
for the corporation, [R. 1642; Neubauer Dep. 36:18-25], and that from his perspective
neither FDS nor Esbex had fraudulent purposes, [R. 1640; Neubauer Dep. 42:9-10]. Mr.
Neubauer agreed that Lowry and Kinsella desired to make a profit but such was "true of
every business." [R. 1668; Neubauer Dep. 11:9-25.] No testimony showed that Lowry
or Kinsella, as owners of both FDS and Esbex, failed to comply with corporate
formalities. The fact that Lowry and Kinsella took money out of the corporation does not
show that corporate funds were treated as personal property, that proper accounting was
absent, or that proper financial records were not kept. Indeed, the undisputed evidence as
stated above shows exactly the opposite. And J&T Marketing presented no evidence
tending to show that Lowry and Kinsella's actions in any way jeopardized the integrity.of
the corporation or were otherwise commercially unreasonable in governing the affairs
and operating FDS and Esbex. [R. 1194-96.]
Since J&T Marketing failed to present a single disputed issue of material fact
concerning the unity of interest and ownership factor, the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella on this prong alone.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Provide Evidence to Support the Fraud*
Injustice, or Inequitable Result Prong of the Alter Ego Theory.

J&T Marketing argues in its brief that the trial court incorrectly failed to consider
the second prong of the alter ego theory. Brief of Appellant at 15. Once the trial court
had determined that J&T Marketing had not presented evidence to support its claim that
the unity of interest prong was met, however, the trial court had no need to consider the
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second prong of the test. [R. 1694.] Nevertheless, Lowry and Kinsella submit that even
if the trial court had ruled that J&T Marketing had satisfied the first prong of the alter ego
test, J&T Marketing still did not present evidence probative to the establishment of a
genuine issue of material fact as to the second prong of the alter ego theory.
To support its argument, J&T Marketing relies on a Utah case in which the court
found that the evidence of undercapitalization demonstrated that maintaining the
corporate shield would be unfair and unjust. See Brief of Appellant at 15 (citing Salt
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). In
James Constructors, this Court noted that among other things the evidence showed that
the subsidiary's officers did not act independently from the parent, that the parent
financed the subsidiary and paid some of its debts, arid that funds were advanced by the
corporate parent only "on an 'as needed' basis, without formal documentation and with
no particular requirements for repayment." Id. The facts of the instant case are clearly
distinguishable. There is no parent-subsidiary relationship in this case. No evidence was
presented that would tend to show either that Lowry or Kinsella personally paid debts of
FDS or Esbex or that these entities paid Lowry and Kinsella's personal debts. There is
no evidence that financial transactions were made without formal documentation or that
funds were advanced on an as needed basis. Instead, the undisputed evidence is that all
financial transactions were documented and accounted for by Mr. Neubauer. [R. 1641;
NeubauerDep. 40: 11-14.]
J&T Marketing additionally relies on a divorce case in which upholding the
corporate form was determined to be unjust because "plaintiffs post-settlement
4836~4530-5603:LO001.004
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agreement business transactions would convert substantial assets, which otherwise would
be regarded as marital property, to corporate assets in which plaintiff had no interest."
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 788 (Utah Ct App. 1987). In Colrnan, the wife
claimed that the husband was hiding marital assets behind corporate entities, which assets
would otherwise be subject to a written property settlement agreement. See id. at 783-84.
In this case, there is no evidence tending to show either that Lowry and Kinsella had used
the entities to hide personal assets or vice versa. Rather, the evidence simply shows that
when J&T Marketing halted its performance under the contract, FDS and Esbex were left
without the supplies to meet its obligations. [R. 1317.] Without a legal basis, J8cT
Marketing improperly seeks restitution out of the personal finances of the corporate
officers of FDS and Esbex.
J&T Marketing asserts that FDS and Esbex were "clearly undercapitalized/5
relying solely on its contention that the entities had relatively short life-spans, that Lowry
and Kinsella took money out of the companies, and that the companies are now insolvent.
Brief ofAppellant at 16. Insolvency does not make maintaining the corporate form unjust
or inequitable. Appellant submits no evidence that would tend to support its claim that
insolvency was caused by undercapitalization. Such a claim would at the very least
require a showing of how much capital was invested verses how much was needed.
Appellant presents no evidence on either point. No evidence was introduced that tended
to show the amount of distributions made to Lowry and Kinsella, that the amounts were
unreasonable, or that the distributions contributed to insolvency.
J&T Marketing has presented no evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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. .

material fact on the second prong of the alter ego theory. Therefore, the trial court
correctly granted summary judgment on that issue to Lowry and Kinsella, and this Court
should affirm.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON J&T MARKETING'S CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST LOWRY AND
KINSELLA SINCE J&T MARKETING DID NOT PRESENT MATERIAL
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THESE CLAIMS.
It is well settled in Utah that if facts "would not establish a basis upon which

plaintiff could recover, no matter how they were resolved, it would be useless to consume
time, effort and expense in trying them, the saving of which is the very purpose of
summary judgment procedure." Abdulkadirv. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 318 P.2d 339, 341
(Utah 1957).

Despite conducting comprehensive discovery into all aspects of the

operations of FDS and Esbex, J&T Marketing failed to establish a factual basis upon
which it could recover against Lowry and Kinsella individually.

The trial court,

recognizing this failure of evidence, properly granted summary judgment to Lowry and
Kinsella through both the 2006 Order and the 2008 Order. Allowing this matter to
proceed would have been an inefficient and unnecessary waste of judicial resources.
J&T Marketing asserts that the trial court incorrectly held that no personal liability
could attach to Lowry and Kinsella. Brief of Appellant at 16. The Utah Supreme Court
has held that a director or officer of a corporation may only be held "individually liable
for fraudulent acts or false representations of his own or in which he participates." Armed
Forces Ins. Exck v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ]fl9, 70 P.3d 35 (emphasis in original, further
citations omitted). The fact that a corporate officer's "duties generally include[]
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overseeing the business activities of the corporation does not alone establish facts
supporting a claim that she is personally liable for fraud." Id. at ^|20 (emphasis in
original). Indeed, the general rule is that "[a] director is not personally liable for his
corporation's contractual breaches unless he assumed personal liability, acted in bad faith
or committed a tort in connection with the performance of the contract." Reedeker v.
Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (further citation and quotation
omitted). As noted by J&T Marketing, Lowry and Kinsella "cannot be held liable for
fraudulent acts that [they] did not know of or participate in that were committed by other
agents of the corporation of by the corporation itself." Harrison, 2003 UT 14 at f20,
Brief of Appellant at 17. While an officer or director may be held individually liable for
torts in which they personally participate, see d'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App
416,ffi[39and 43, 147 P.3d 515, J&T Marketing failed to provide evidentiary support for
each element of its claims. Thus, J&T Marketing's claims fail as a matter of law, and the
trial court properly granted summary judgment dismissing those claims.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment Dismissing
J&T Marketing's Claim of Theft by Conversion Against Lowry and
Kinsella.

The trial court correctly granted Lowry and Kinsella summary judgment oil J&T
Marketing's second cause of action for theft by conversion. Theft by conversion requires
the "willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the
person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." State v. Twitchett, 832 P.2d
866, 870 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "A party alleging conversion must show that he or she is
entitled to immediate possession of the property at the time of the alleged conversion."
4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
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Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, p i , 155 P.3d 917 (quotations and citations omitted)
(emphasis in original). J&T Marketing assert that Lowry and Kinsella individually
interfered with J&T Marketing's product, leads, client lists, and money.

These

allegations arise out of J&T Marketing's interpretation of the contractual obligations of
FDS found in the Agreement. See Tab A. [R. 33-37.] The cited evidence in support of
these allegations, however, fails to demonstrate that Lowry and Kinsella converted any of
J&T Marketing's property.
J&T Marketing presented no evidence that Lowry or Kinsella converted J&T
Marketing's property to their own use. In fact, the actual evidence was to the contrary.
[R. 1193-94.] J&T Marketing's evidence does not support the allegation that Lowry or
Kinsella kept refunded product from J&T Marketing. Under the Agreement, FDS would
notify J&T Marketing when a customer purchased a Ted Thomas product and J&T
Marketing was supposed to ship the product to the customer. [R 2311.] It is undisputed
that J&T Marketing stopped shipping Ted Thomas product, [R. 1317]* and there is some
evidence that FDS used some of the returned product to fill orders which J&T had
stopped filling, [R. 1597]. However, there is no evidence that this in any way adversely
affected J&T Marketing. In fact, the only evidence J&T Marketing puts forward is Mr.
Neubauer's statement that "[w]e were trying to fulfill [sic] to make people happy and
prevent a refund or cancellation."

[R. at 1647, Neubauer Dep. 16:13-14.]

J&T

Marketing has presented no evidence that such reuse of product constituted a violation of
the Agreement, that it adversely affected J&T Marketing, or in any way created a
personal liability of Lowry or Kinsella.
4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
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Further, J&T Marketing's cited evidence does not support its allegation that
Lowry and Kinsella took money they knew was earmarked for J&T customer refunds.
First, this "converted property," even if any evidence existed to support this claim, did
not belong to J&T Marketing, and J&T Marketing had no right to immediately possession
of the property. Rather it would have belonged to J&T Marketing's customers, who are
not parties to this matter. Second, and more importantly, the evidence cited by J&T
Marketing establishes only that Mr. Neubauer informed Lowry and Kinsella of lists of
people who had been approved for refunds* and that instead of knowingly and personally
appropriating money earmarked for refunds for themselves, Lowry and Kinsella
instructed Mr. Neubauer to "try to find a way to free up expenses and free up cash flow."
[R. 1644-45, Neubauer Dep. at 24:20 through 25:25.] While Lowry and Kinsella do not
dispute the fact that refunds were anticipated under the contract, there is no evidence that
they knowingly and personally appropriated earmarked refund money for their own use.
Finally, J&T Marketing claims that FDS did not report the coaching fees that it
charged and received and that J&T Marketing was entitled to a percentage of the
coaching fees collected by FDS. FDS did not report coaching fees because those fees
were not part of the contract with J&T Marketing. [R. 1644, Neubauer Dep. 26:10
through 28:12.] Mr. Neubauer testified that FDS and Esbex did not have fraudulent
purposes in interpreting the contract and that he had no information concerning
fraudulent actions with respect to Kinsella or Lowry in connection with the Ted Thomas
account. [R. 1640; Neubauer Dep. 42:12-15.]

J&T Marketing fails to show any

contractual provision that would have entitled it to a share of these fees.
4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
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The factual support for its claim initially rested exclusively upon Mr. Neubauer's
bankruptcy deposition, which the trial court expressly struck from the record. [R. 1695.]
J&T Marketing was permitted to retake Mr. Neubauer's deposition and did so on October
18, 2005. J&T Marketing fails to demonstrate that it attempted to solicit any relevant
information in Mr. Neubauer's second deposition that materially supported its claim.
What J&T Marketing does cite to is testimony from Mr. Neubauer's second deposition
indicating only that Mr. Neubauer would have consulted with Lo\vry and Kinsella about
sending out refunded product to new purchasers. [R. 1647.] This is not evidence that he
actual consulted with them or that if he did consult with him, what Lowry or Kinsella
might have said. Thus, J&T Marketing's own evidence fails to establish that Lowry and
Kinsella intentionally converted property belonging to others. .
In any event, J&T Marketing could only pursue its claim for theft by conversion if
the evidence demonstrated that Lowry and Kinsella had personally interfered without
legal justification with J&T Marketing's property that J&T Marketing was entitled to
immediate possession. See Bennett, 2007 UT App 19 at p i . The dispute in this case is
contractual, hinging on interpretation of the Agreement as to each aspect of J&T
Marketing's conversion claim. Because its allegations regarding the theft by conversion
claim are unsubstantiated, J&T Marketing failed in its burden to establish elements
essential to its case.
Without any evidence tending to prove that Lowry or Kinsella converted the
property of J&T Marketing, the trial court had no alternative but to grant summary
judgment in favor of Appellees.
4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
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B.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment Dismissing
J&T Marketing's Claim of Constructive Fraud Against Lowry and
Kinsella,

The trial court properly concluded that constructive fraud could not be maintained
against Lowry or Kinsella as a matter of law. "To demonstrate constructive fraud in
Utah, a party [must] demonstrate 'two elements: (i) a confidential relationship between
the parties; and (ii) a failure to disclose material facts.'" D'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006
UT App 416, Tf51, 147 P.3d 515 (farther citations omitted). As to the first question, J&T
Marketing has failed to present any evidence that would tend to create a confidential
relationship. "A confidential relationship is a prerequisite to proving constructive fraud."
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). "The doctrine of confidential
relationships rests upon the principle of inequality between the parties, and implies a
position of superiority occupied by one of the parties over the other." Id.
While a confidential relationship "may be created by contract or by circumstances
where equity will imply a higher duty in a relationship because the trusting party has
been induced to relax the care and vigilance he would ordinarily exercise," Hal Taylor
Assocs., v. Unionamerica Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982), there is no evidence that
Lowry and Kinsella entered into such a relationship with J&T Marketing.

J&T

Marketing presented "no overmastering influence, dependence, or trust justifiably (and
with mutual understanding) reposed" in Lowry and Kinsella. First Security Bank of
Utah N.A. v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Utah 1989), Nor "was there
any evidence of weakness of age, mental strength, business experience or intelligence" to
establish a confidential relationship. Id. at 1333-34.
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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The only relationship here between the parties arose out of the Agreement between
J&T Marketing and FDS. Utah courts have determined that the "confidential
relationship" required by Utah law to establish constructive fraud does not include
business dealings similar to the one here. See Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 85,
TFP9-20, 69 P.3d 286 (no confidential relationship between a buyer and seller of any
property); State Bank ofS Utah v. Troy Hygro Sys., Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Utah
Ct.App.1995) (finding confidential relationship claim failed as a matter of law between
bank and customer). Under the Agreement, FDS agreed, as an independent contractor, to
sell J&T Marketing's products to leads it supplied. [R. 37.] While a typical contractual
relationship was established between FDS and J&T Marketing, no evidence was
presented that would tend to prove that that relationship ever met the standard;of a
"confidential relationship" necessary to proceed with a constructive fraud claim under the
facts alleged by J&T Marketing. Importantly, it must be noted that as to Lowry and
Kinsella, J&T Marketing allege that there is a contractual relationship individually with
Appellees, but J&T Marketing fails to put forth any evidence to support this claim.
It is quite clear that "a contract between [one party] and a corporation is not a
contract between [that party] and those individuals who direct or manage the
corporation." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). It is
undisputed that FDS maintained its corporate formalities and that Lowry and Kinsella,
acting in their corporate capacities, took actions that they felt were commercially
reasonable.

[R. 1194-96.]

Further there is no evidence that Lowry and Kinsella

personally had the obligation or failed to disclose material facts to J&T Marketing under
4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Agreement.
As with much of its other cited evidence, J&T Marketing relies almost exclusively
upon Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition, which the trial court expressly struck in its
entirety. [R. 1695.] To the extent Mr. Neubauer's subsequent deposition in this case is
relied upon, the evidence fails to support any claim that Lowry and Kinsella personally
failed to disclose any material facts known to them.8

Therefore, Lowry nor Kinsella

annot be held liable for constructive fraud. The trial court properly granted summary
judgment on J&T Marketing's constructive fraud claim as a matter of law.
C.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment Dismissing
J&T Marketing's Claim of Fraudulent Non-Disclosure Against Lowry
and Kinsella.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment on J&T Marketing's cause of
action for fraudulent non-disclosure against Lowry and Kinsella. A party alleging
fraudulent non-disclosure must prove at least the following three elements: "(1) tib-e
nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the
party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate." Hermansen v.

J&T Marketing cites to evidence it asserts demonstrates that Lowry and Kinsella were
involved in the decision to sell coaching without reporting to J&T Marketing. [R. 1615.]
Mr. Neubauer's testimony was only to the effect that he did not report coaching fees
because he was instructed that the fees belonged to FDS. [R. 1644, Neubauer Dep. 27:22
through 28:1.] Indeed Mr. Neubauer stated "I'm not going to say he told me not to report
it because I might have done that on my own, given the circumstances." [R. 1644,
Neubauer Dep. 18:5-7.] The evidence presented by J&T Marketing does not show that
coaching sales had to be reported to J&T Marketing under the Agreement, or that
disclosing such sales was material to any confidential relationship between J&T
Marketing and Lowry or Kinsella. [R. 33-37.]
4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
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Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, f 24, 48 P.3d 235.9 Utah Courts have held that "[a] person who
possesses important, even vital information of interest to another has no legal duty to
communicate the information where no relationship between the parties exists." Yazd v.
Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47 fl7, 143 P.3d 283. In this matter, J&T Marketing
never presented evidence to support a legal basis for a duty to coffimunicate such
information. [R. 1294-95.] Without a legal duty to communicate, Lowry and Kinsella
could not be held liable for fraudulent non-disclosure as a matter of law.
The relationship between J&T Marketing and FDS arose out of the Agreement.
Pursuant to this agreement FDS had to "fax or email orders, for Jones' products, daily to
Jones." [R. 37.] FDS was also required to provide a report of the previous week's sales
and the compensation and reimbursement due to J&T Marketing and a report of the
"sales made the two weeks prior." [R. 36.] The purpose of the was to allow FDS, "as an
independent contractor,

to sell these products designated for sale by Jones ('Jones'

products') to those leads, [sic] supplied by Jones ('Jones' leads')."

[R. 37.] It is

undisputed that Esbex, not FDS, provided the coaching/mentoring services and that no
contract existed between Esbex and J&T Marketing [R. 1319.] The person whose
responsibility it was to provide these reports was John Neubauer. [R. 131849.] There is
no evidence that Mr. Neubauer was not a capable and responsible person to perform this
task. There is no evidence that Lowry and Kinsella interfered with this process of that

9

There must also be proof that the fraud caused damages. Dilworth v. Lauritzen,l% Utah
2d 386, 390, 424 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1967) (trial judge justified in finding for defendant
on further ground that no competent evidence was given regarding the damages which
might have been sustained even if there had been fraud).
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they had undertaken a personal obligation to report coaching fees to J&T Marketing.
There is no evidence show that either (i) Lowry and Kinsella had a personal legal
obligation to communicate information to J&T Marketing, or (ii) that they failed to
communicate any other information that they individually had a legal obligation to
communicate to J&T Marketing. J&T Marketing's claims against Lowry and Kinsella
thus failed as a matter of law.
Because evidence establishing the essential elements of fraudulent non-disclosure
was absent, J&T Marketing failed to establish a basis for recovering on this claim, and
summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law.
D.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment Dismissing
J&T Marketing's Claim of Intentional Interference with Business
Relations Against Lowry and Kinsella.

The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella on
J&T Marketing's Ninth cause of action for intentional interference with business
relations. To succeed on a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, "a
plaintiff must demonstrate that c (l) • • • the defendant intentionally interfered with the
plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.'" Anderson Development Co, v.
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, TJ20, 116 P-3d 323 (citing Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn,
657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982)). To establish improper purpose, "the plaintiff must show
that the defendant's 'predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff.'" Id. To establish
improper means, "a plaintiff must show 'that the defendant's means of interference were
contrary to statutory, regulatory, or common law or violated an established standard of a
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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trade or profession.5" Id. (quoting Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah
1994)). In support of this claim, J&T Marketing merely alleges that Lowry and Kinsella
intentionally interfered with J&T Marketing's business leads.

A poor attempt to

repackage the breach of contract claim and disregard the corporate form, this claim is not
supported by evidence. [R. 1293-94.] J&T Marketing has not supported a single alleged
instance where Lowry or Kinsella personally and intentionally interfered with one of J&T
Marketing's current or prospective business relationships.
While J&T Marketing asserts that FDS resold refunded product to new customers,
[R. 1314], the evidence J&T Marketing cites to does not support its claims that Lowry
and Kinsella intentionally interfered for an improper purpose. It is not disputed that even
while the contract remained in force, J&T Marketing had discontinued shipping product
to customers who had ordered the product as a result of FDS sales. [R. 1317.] FDS filled
some orders by shipping products that had been returned by other clients, but Mr.
Neubauer's testimony was that he did so to try "to fulfill to make people happy and
prevent a refund or cancellation." [R. 1647, Neubauer Dep. at 16:4-14.] There is no
evidence that by using refunded product to fill these customer orders FDS did anything
improper or caused any harm to J&T Marketing's existing or potential economic relations
or that such action was done for an improper purpose or by improper means.
Beyond FDS's actions, there is no evidence that any alleged actions by Lowry and
Kinsella's were made with the predominant purpose of injuring J&T Marketing, see
Tobias, 2005 UT 36 at 1f20, or that Lowry and Kinsella's alleged actions were contrary to
statutory, regulatory, or common law or violated an established standard of a trade or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law30
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profession, see id. J&T Marketing allege that Lowry and Kinsella treated its customers
poorly, but its evidence supporting this claim arises solely out of the stricken deposition
testimony of Mr. Neubauer. See Brief of Appellant at 20. And there is no evidence that
FDS could not continue to sell coaching after terminating the Agreement. See Agreement
at Tab A. Finally, J&T Marketing has failed to provide any evidence that continuing to
sell coaching intentionally interfered with J&T Marketing's existing or potential
relations; that continuing to sell coaching was done for an improper purpose or by
improper means; or that continuing to sell coaching caused injury to J&T Marketing.
Without evidence to support the elements of its claim of intentional interference
with economic relations, J&T Marketing lacks a basis for recovering on this claim, and
this court should affirm the trial court's decision to grant Lowry and Kinsella summary
judgment on this matter.
E.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment Dismissing
J&T Marketing's Claim of Fraudulent Misrepresentation Against
Lowry and Kinsella.

J&T Marketing's Third cause of action in the Amended Complaint alleged
fraudulent misrepresentation against Lowry, Kinsella, Mr. Neubauer and FDS. J&T
Marketing's claim on this cause of action rests on alleged failures to perform promises
found in the contract. [R. 1033-34.] These allegations cannot properly be characterized
as fraudulent misrepresentations at all, but are rather, on their face, simply allegations of
breach of contract at most. J&T Marketing rests these so-styled tort claims on the
supposed testimony of Mr. Neubauer that FDS withheld income from coaching fees and
made misrepresentations as to the volume of sales. Brief of Appellant at 18. Appellant
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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had opportunity to take Mr. Neubauer's deposition in this case and had every opportunity
to solicit information admissible in this case to support this claim. This Appellant failed
to do. Instead, Mr. Neubauer stated in his deposition takeii in this case that FDS did not
believe that coaching fees fell under the Agreement with J&T Marketing. [R. 1644,
Neubauer Dep. 26:10 to 28:12.] Even if J&T Marketing had appealed the trial court's
decision to exclude Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition, and that decision were to be
reversed, and the excluded testimony were to be considered, J&T Marketing presents no
evidence10 that would establish that Lowry or Kinsella individually or personally made
any misrepresentations.
In order to succeed on a claim for fraud in Utah, a plaintiff must prove the
following elements, by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) [tjhat a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a)
knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8)
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, f41, 56 P.3d 524. In this case,
there are no issues of material fact with respect to several of the above-identified

Again, J&T Marketing's citations to the record here do not seem to align with actual
pages in the record supporting its claims. To the extent J&T Marketing's citations refer to
portions of its original Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and
Nathan Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment that rely on the bankruptcy declaration
of Mr. Neubauer, the citations fail to support their allegations since the trial court struck
Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition in its entirety and held that it could only be relied
upon to the extent it was corroborated by his October 18, 2005 deposition testimony. [R.
1695.] J&T Marketing has not appealed the trial court's decision on that issue.
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elements. Initially, the trial court determined that a statement attributed to Lowry by J&T
Marketing to the effect that "FDS would cease selling Thomas's product and cease using
Thomas's name and leads" was disregarded by FDS. [R. 1908.] J&T Marketing could
not produce any writing by Lowry to demonstrate that he in fact made the statement
attributed to him.
It is not disputed that the Agreement states that upon termination FDS was to
"immediately cease: (i) Any contact with Jones' leads; (ii) Selling Jones' products; (iii)
In any way representing to any party that it is a seller of Jones [sic] products; and (iv) The
use of Jones' trademarks [sic] service marks or other Confidential Information. [R. 34.]
By its very nature, a contractual promise to perform in the future is not a statement of a
presently existing material fact unless the promise is made without any intent to perform,
that is, "a promise of future performance, when made with a present intent not to perform
and made to induce a party to act in reliance on that promise, constitutes actionable deceit
and fraud." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985). J&T Marketing failed
to present any evidence to demonstrate that Lowry had no intent to perform any
obligations under the Agreement when he signed the Agreement on behalf of FDS. [R
2382.] Indeed, in both the 2006 Order and the 2008 Order, the trial court concluded that
J&T Marketing had presented no evidence to show that Lowry or Kinsella had a present
interest not to perform at the time of the contract. [R 1908-09, 2382.]
It is not disputed that FDS informed J&T Marketing would "cease using Thomas's
name and leads." [R. 2345-47.] It is also not disputed that Lowry instructed FDS
employees not to sell Jones product and that that instruction was never rescinded. [R.
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
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2343-44; 2380-81.] It is undisputed that any sale of Jones product after July 19, 2002
occurred without Lowry's knowledge. [R. 2343-44, 2381.] J&T Marketing failed to
present any evidence that the statement made by Lowry that FDS would "cease using
Thomas's name and leads" was made with "no presently existing intent to perform." See
Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 770. [R. 2381.]
In addition, J&T Marketing failed to present any evidence supporting other
elements required to establish a claim for fraud. For example, J&T Marketing presented
no evidence that it was induced to rely upon any alleged misrepresentations made by
Lowry or Kinsella. [R. 1908-09, 2380.] J&T Marketing failed to present any evidence
. that its reliance on any alleged representations was reasonable. [Id.] J&T Marketing
failed to present any evidence of its damages that arose out of the alleged
misrepresentations. [R. 2379.] "[M]ere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported
by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts are insufficient to preclude . . . summary
judgment." Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, ^36, 21
P.3d 198. Since J&T Marketing presented no material facts to support each element of
itsfraudulentmisrepresentation allegation, summary judgment was appropriate.
For all of the specific causes of action J&T Marketing alleged against Lowry and
Kinsella, the evidence presented to the trial court by J&T Marketing was at best "merely
colorable" and "not significantly probative." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S.
242,249 (1986). As such its submissions were insufficient to demonstrate genuine issues
of material fact. See id. at 249-50 Thus, the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment because J&T Marketing failed to meet its burden of presenting evidence
4836-4530-5603 :LO001.004
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establishing a reasonable inference that leads to Lowry and Kinsella5 s individual liability.
Therefore, Defendants Lowry and Kinsella respectfully request that this Court uphold the
decision of the trial court and deny J&T Marketing's Appeal.
IV.

THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE ALSO PRECLUDES
MARKETING FROM RECOVERING ON ITS CLAIMS,

J&T

Application of the economic loss rule should also prevent J&T Marketing from
maintaining its claims against Lowry or Kinsella. Although this argument was not raised
before the trial court, "[i]n Utah, 'an appellate court may affirm a judgment, order, or
decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record, even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the
basis of its ruling.555 Busche v. Salt Lake County, 2001 UT App 111, f7, 26 P.3d 862
(quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998)) (further quotations omitted).
"The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine that marks the fundamental
boundary between contract law, which protects expectancy interests created through
agreement between the parties, and tort law, which protects individuals and their property
from physical harm by imposing a duty of reasonable care." SME Indus,, Inc. v.
Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback and Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, ^j32, 28 P.3d 669. In
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235, the Utah Supreme Court in turn adopted
the interpretation of the economic loss rule that had been previously adopted by the
Colorado Supreme Court. See id. at^|17. Under this interpretation,
The initial inquiry in cases where the line between contract and tort blurs is
whether a duty exists independent of any contractual obligations between
the parties. When an independent duty exists, the economic loss rule does
not bar a tort claim "because the claim is based on a recognized
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independent duty of care and thus does not fall within the scope of the
rule."
Id. (quoting Town of Alma v. Azco Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1263 (Colo. 2000)).
According to this interpretation, "'a party suffering only economic loss from the breach
of an express or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach
absent an independent duty of care under toft law.'" Id. at ^16 (quoting Grynberg v. Agri
Tech Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1269 (Colo. 2000)) (emphasis added in Hermansen)}1

The

Utah Supreme Court has since noted that it has "expressly adopted the independent dutybased rule articulated in Town of Alma" Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8,
Tf49, 70 P.3d 1. This Court recently applied the rule adopted by Supreme Court in
Hermansen, when it considered whether real estate appraisers owe an independent duty
to non-contracting buyers. See West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, f 19, 139
P.3d 1059.12
For purposes of this rule, economic loss is defined as follows:
[Djamages for inadequate value, cost of repair and replacement of the
We note that other Utah cases have held that economic damages may not be recovered
for negligence but may be recovered "in cases involving intentional torts." SME Indus.,
Inc., 2001 UT 54 at ^|32 and n.8; American Towers Owners Assyn v. CCI Mechanical,
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190 and n.ll (Utah 1996). However, the Utah Supreme Court,
reviewing the economic loss rule as it applied to contracts subject to Wyoming law,
stated that "we do not find American Tower Owners Ass 'n and SME Industries persuasive
authority regarding the current state of the economic loss rule in Wyoming or Utah!'
Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, f*9, 70 P.3d 1 (emphasis added).
However, we also note that this Court distinguished Hermansen in another case and
reverted to the American Towers interpretation of the economic loss rule that "economic
damages are not recoverable in negligence absent physical property damage or bodily
injury." Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, fl5 and n.7, 77 P.3d 339 (quoting
American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1189.
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defective product, or consequent loss of profits - without any claim of
personal injury or damage to other property . . . as well as 'the diminution
in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality and does not
work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold.'"
American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1189 (quoting Maack v. Resource Design & Cohstr., Inc.,
875 P.2d 570, 579-80 (Utah Ct App. 1994) (further citation omitted)).
The Colorado interpretation of the economic loss rule as adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court is based upon the understanding that "[cjontract law is intended to
enforce the expectancy interests created by parties' promises so that they can allocate
risks and costs during their bargaining." Town of Alma, 10 P.3d at 1262. Further,
"[l]imiting tort liability when a contract exists between parties is appropriate because a
product's potential nonperformance can be adequately addressed by rational ecdnomic
actors bargaining at aims length to shape the terms of the contract." Id. Thus, "the law
serves to encourage parties to confidently allocate risks and costs during their bargaining
without fear that unanticipated liability may arise in the future, effectively negating the
parties' efforts to build these cost considerations into the contract." Id. Though the
economic loss rule initially arose out of the product liability context, Utah courts have not
limited the rule to that context. See SME Industries, 2001 UT 54 at T|35 (applying the
economic loss rule "in the construction setting"); Hermansen, 2002 UT 52 at \\1
(applying the economic loss rule in a real estate transaction, but adopting a rule without
expressly limiting the context in which it would apply).
In this case, J&T Marketing has not identified any independent duty other than the
contractual duties negotiated by FDS and J&T Marketing. Brief of Appellants at 19.
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Outside of the contract, J&T Marketing has presented no evidence of any other facts
giving rise to a duty owed by Lowry and Kinsella to J&T Marketing. In addition, the
damages sought by J&T Marketing, to the extent damages are alleged to have been
caused by Lowry and Kinsella, are economic damages that J&T Marketing may recover,
if at all, pursuant to the application of contract law. [R. 1028-29, 1032, 1034.] Each of
the tort claims brought against Kinsella and Lowry was also brought against FDS. [R.
1028-29,1032-34.] J&T Marketing alleged damages couched in tort terms. [R. 1028-29,
1032-34.] However, all of the damages alleged by J&T Marketing when it sought default
judgment against FDS and Esbex were rooted in the contract and calculated in tetins of
the contract.13 [R. 2187-89.] Therefore, the economic loss rule should preclude J&T
Marketing from pursuing its tort claims against Lowry and Kinsella.
CONCLUSION
Lowry and Kinsella assert that the evidence presented to the trial court was
insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, they were
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all of the claims brought against them
personally. Under the economic loss rule, this Court may also properly affirm the trial
In obtaining default judgment against FDS and Esbex, J&T Marketing identified a
"contractual and special damages" amount and then used this amount to calculate general
damages (multiplying the contractual damages by three) and punitive damages (using the
same amount it had identified for contractual damages) plus attorney fees. [R. 2187-89,
2216.] Thus, J&T Marketing obtained a default judgment against FDS and Esbex not
only for its damages arising out of the protections negotiated in the Agreement with FDS,
but also for tort damages arising out of the same alleged conduct constituting breach of
contract, giving J&T Marketing the benefit of a windfall award of damages over and
above the protections J&T Marketing had bargained for in its contract. Should this Court
overturn the district court's ruling, and allow J&T Marketing to pursue its tort claims, it
is certain that these same damages will be pursued against Lowry and Kinsella.
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court's decision to granted Lowry and Kinsella summary judgment against J&T
Marketing's tort claims. Therefore, Lowry and Kinsella respectfully request that this
Court affirm the trial court's 2006 and 2008 Orders.
Dated this

of June, 2009,
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

Earl Jay Peck
R. Christopher Preston
Attorneys for Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
4836-4530-5603:LO001.004
39
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM
Tab A

Sales and Marketing Agreement

Tab B

Ruling Granting In Part Defendants Lowry and Kinsella Js Motion for
Summary Judgment, entered on February 1,2006

Tab C

Order on Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary
Judgment entered on March 21; 2006
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Order Granting Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry's Motion for Summary
Judgment, entered October 8,2008
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SALES AND MARKETING AGREEMENT
This Sales and Marketing Agreement is made and is effective this >( of January 2002, by and
between FDS ("Seller") and Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ("Jones").
RECITAL
Seller desires to perform certain sales and telemarketing services as on the terms and conditions
set forth to herein.
PROVISIONS
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:
1. Scope of the Agreement: Seller agrees as an independent contractor, to sell these products
designated for sale by Jones ("Jones' products") to those leads, supplied by Jones ("Jones' leads")
as further defined by the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth,
2. Seller's Services:
A,. Seller will market and sell Jones products to Jones leads during the term of this
agreement.
B, Seller will work toward developing marketing strategies (and will inform Jones) for
distribution of Jones' products to Jones5 leads; provided however, before implementing
any marketing strategies the strategies will be approved by Jones in writing,
C, Seller will get credit card approvals for sales of Jones' products using FDS' merchant
account
D, Sales paid by check will be made payable to Jones and Trevor Marketing, Inc.
E Seller can make available, if needed, a dedicated 800 number so that Jones can include
this number in its products,
F. Seller will use marketing scripts already being used and included as Exhibit A.
G. Seller will do its best to keep returns below 15% and generate at least $200 per lead
after cancels.
H. Seller will also be able to sell its own 4 week start-up coaching program for a one-time
fee of $995 plus charge a $99 ongoing monthly coaching service fee.
I Seller will fax or email orders, for Jones' products, daily to Jones.
3. Services by Jones:
A, Jones shall provide Seller leads, which will include the names, addresses, and phone
numbers, to allow Seller to perform its duties hereunder.
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B. Seller will submit a report of Seller's previous week's sales and the compensation and
reimbursement due Jones as defined in Section 5. Report shall be sent by Seller each
Friday for the sales made the two weeks prior, Report will include, hut not be limited to:
(i) A breakdown and total, by order, showing the monies due to Jones as defined
in Section 5, Compensation and Reimbursement.
(ii) A breakdown of each bad check, customer return and credit card chargeback.
These are defined as "Cancels" and the commissions previously retained by
Seller for these sales will be deducted on each weekly wire made by the Seller,
C. Jones shall provide Seller leads on each Friday.
D. Seller will process all credit card sales on Seller's merchant accounts.
4. Setter's Representations, Warranties. & Covenants;
A. Seller represents and warrants that it is not a party to any agreement, which would be
breached by execution, delivery, and performance of the terras of this Agreement to be
performed by the Seller,
B. Seller represents and warrants that it has all rights to any material used and furnished
by it in connection with performance of its service hereunder.
C. Seller acknowledges that as a result of its agreement hereunder, it shall be making use
of, acquiring or adding to confidential information of a special unique nature and value
relating to any Jones' trade secrets, systems, programs, procedures, manuals, confidential
reports, and communications and customer lists (including Jones' customer list)
("Confidential Information71), Seller further acknowledges that this information is a
valuable, special, and unique asset of Jones and that such information is and shall remain
the property of Jones, Additionally, Seller acknowledges that Jones may suffer
substantial harm if the Confidential Information or any confidential information is
disclosed including, without limitation, the list of Jones' leads. Therefore, Seller
covenants and agrees to hold the Confidential Information in confidence and neither to
use the Confidential Information for its own benefit or for the benefit of another, nor
disclose the Confidential Information, now or in the future, except for the use and
disclosure with the prior written consent of Jones or in the performance of Seller's duties
for Jones1 benefit during the term of and under this Agreement. Additionally, Seller
covenants and agrees not to directly or indirectly by phone, mail, fax, email, website, or
otherwise solicit Jones' leads except in the performance of its duties for Jones' benefit
under and during the term of this Agreement. The covenants set forth in this paragraph
shall survive termination of the Seller's engagement under this Agreement indefinitely.
D. Seller covenants and agrees that it shall not, directly or indirectly, as an employee,
shareholder, partner, independent contractor or otherwise, for any reason whatsoever,
during the term of this Agreement and for a period of three (3) years following
termination of this Agreement, for any reason, solicit, recruit, or in any manner attempt to
solicit or recruit a person that is an employee of Jones to leave such employment
relationship or induce such person to leave such relationship.
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E. Seller covenants and agrees that upon termination of this Agreement, it shall return all
Jones' materials provide by Jones (or an entity designated by Jones) to be sold by Seller
hereunder or to be used by the Seller to assist Seller's selling efforts hereunder including,
but not limited to, Jones' products, videos, audio reproductions, or testimonial letters.
F. Seller covenants and agrees that it shall perform its services diligently on behalf of
Jones and shall refrain from engaging in any activity which directly or indirectly could be
considered misleading, puffing, false, or deceptive,
G. Seller covenants and agrees that it shall either itself or through its attorneys review and
comply with the laws of the state in which it markets and sells Jones' products to Jones'
leads and the laws of the United States of America including, without limitation, Federal
Trade Commission Rules, Federal Trade Commission Deceptive Practices Laws, State
Home Solicitation Acts and State Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
5. Compensation and Reimbursement:
A. In consideration of Seller performing its services hereunder, Jones agrees to pay and
reimburse seller:
(i) A commission equal to 60% of all gross sales made by Seller not including
shipping charges by Jones, Out of that 60%, Seller will place 10% of all gross salesinto a reserve fund for any Cancels that may occur, Any Cancels, defined as all
returns, bad checks, and credit card chargebacks, will be paid from that reserve fund
and reported in a weekly reconciliation report, At the end of six months, a financial
reconciliation of that reserve will be completed and provided to Jones,
(ii) Commissions are to be sent via bank wire each Friday for the previous week.
6. Holdback:
A, Seller will hold back 2,5% (two and one half percent) of the sales due to Jones each
week until Seller has on reserve of Jones $100,000, These funds will be used as a reserve
against bad checks, credit card returns and chargebacks for sales that were made prior to
the termination of this agreement. Jones' sales portion of all bad checks, credit card
returns and chargebacks that occur after the termination of this agreement will be
deductedfromthis reserve.
B. Since the credit card chargebacks process may occur up to 6 months after the date of
the sale and take another 6 months in the paperwork process (total of 12 months) the
remaining reserve will be returned as follows:
(i) $10,000 per month beginning 3 months after the termination of this
agreement
7. Independent Contractor:
A, The parties acknowledge that the relationship established by this agreement is one of
independent contractor/contractor and not employee/employer. The parties are
responsible for paying their own respective employees, any taxes resulting from sales
made or commissions paid or earned pursuant to this Agreement, withholding takes,
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unemployment taxes, state, federal and local taxes and the like. Neither party may hold
itself out as a representative of the other party except as specifically set forth in this
Agreement.
8. Indemnification:
A, Seller agrees to defend, hold harmless and indemnify Jonesfromany and all
liabilities, expenses, actions, suits, proceedings, damages or judgineats including, but not
limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees, arising from any act or commission of seller in the
performance of services hereunder or selling Jones' products or as a result of a breach of
any term, condition, representation, warranty, or covenant contained in this Agreement
by Seller,
B, Jones1 shall defend, hold harmless indemnify Seller from any and all liabilities,
expenses, actions, suits, claims' proceedings, damages or judgments including, but not
limited to, reasonable attorneys* fees, arisingfromany act or commission of seller in the
performance of services hereunder or selling Jones' products or as a result of a breach of
any term, condition, representation, wananty or covenant contained in this Agreement by
Jones.
9. Term:
A. The term of this Agreement shall be for twelve (12) months. This Agreement shall
automatically renew for twelve (12) months if its termination is not confirmed in writing
anytime prior to the end of the current term. This Agreement may be terminated prior to
the end of the term as follows:
(i) Seller may terminate this Agreement upon breach by Jones of any term or
condition to be performed by Jones in this Agreement which is not cured by
Jones within ten (10) days of the written notice from Seller.
(ii) Jones may terminate this Agreement at anytime upon 45 days notice to Seller.
Upon Termination any funds held back by Seller under Paragraph 6A will be
returned to seller in a manner consistent with 6B(I),
10. Obligations on Termination:
A. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall immediately cease:
(i) Any contact with Jones* leads;
(ii) Selling Jones' products;
(iii) In any way representing to any party that it is a seller of Jones products; and
(iv) The use of Jones' trademarks service marks or other Confidential
" Information.
B. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall provide Jones a final accounting of
compensation and reimbursement due Jones and forward funds within 10 business days
by bank wire transfer.
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C. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall return to Jones all Jones'
Confidential Information, including Jones' customer leads or lists, and all Jones'
products, within forty eight (48) hours of termination by overnight delivery service.
11. Miscellaneous;
A. This Agreement:
(i) Shall constitute the entire agreement between the parties hereto and
supersedes all prior agreements, written or oral, concerning the subject matter
herein and there are no oral understandings, statements or stipulations bearing
upon the effect of this Agreement which have not been incorporates herein.
(ii) May be modified or amended only by a written instrument signed by each of
the parties hereto,
(iii) Shall bind and insure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective
heirs, Successors and assigns,
B, All notices hereunder shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been delivered
on the day of mailing if sent by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid and return
receipt requested to the addresses set forth at the beginning of this Agreement or such
other address known by party sending notice hereunder,
C, Any litigation involving this Agreement shall be adjudicated in a court with
jurisdiction located in Utah County, Orem, Utah and the parties irrevocably consent to
the personal jurisdiction and venue of such court.
D, If any provision of this Agreement shall be held invalid or unenforceable by
competent authority, such provision shall be constructed so as to be limited or reduced to
be enforceable to the maximum extent compatible with the law as it shall then appear.
The total invalidity or enforceability of any particular'provision of this Agreement shall
not affect the other provisions hereof and this Agreement shall be consumed in all
respects as if such invalid or unenforceable provision were omitted
. E. In the event of litigation to enforce the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the
losing party agrees to pay the prevailing party's cost and expenses incurred including,
without limitation, reasonable attorneys* fees.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement on the first date above
written.
Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc.

By: "Jd&^US
Its:
Date:

£lC^V*"&*>
^ f ^

Date: FU

^a>%
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC.

RULING GRANTING IN PART
DEFENDANTS LOWRY'S AND
KINSELLA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES,
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN
NEUBAUER, JONATHAN L. LOWRY,
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX, LLC,

Case No. 050100038

Judge Derek P. Pullan

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Jonathan L. Lowry's and Nathan Kinsella's
("Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on May 21,2005. Plaintiff Jones & Trevor
Marketing ("Plaintiff' or "J &T Marketing") filed a Memorandum in Opposition on June 24,2005. On
July 21, 2005, Defendants' filed their Memorandum in Reply in conjunction with a motion to strike the
banlcruptcy deposition of John Neubauer. Plaintiff opposed the motion to strike on August 1,2005. The
Court heard oral argument on both motions on September 22, 2005. The Plaintiff was represented by
Mr, Stephen Quesenberry, the Defendants were represented by Mr. Benjamin T. Wilson.
At the hearing, the Court granted Defendants' motion to strike, but allowed J&T Marketing the
opportunity to depose Mr. Neubauer again, this time in the presence of Defendants' counsel. On

1
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November 22, 2005, subsequent to the talcing of Mr. Neubauer's deposition, Plaintiff filed a
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. On
December 12, 2005, Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their motion for
summary judgment. Both parties filed notices to submit for decision, and neither request asked the
Court to hear oral argument again on the matter.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
After careful review of the pleadings, the Court finds the following facts are not in dispute:
1.

Plaintiff J&T Marketing is a Nevada corporation that sells training courses developed by its
owner and principal, Ted Thomas. These courses offer information to those who purchase them
about how to buy tax lien certificates and engage in other similar activities to make money.
(Amd. Cpl.fflf1,10).

2.

'

.

Defendant FDS was a Utah corporation from June 22,1998 until November 3,2004 when it was
dissolved. (Amd. Cpl. \ 2; Dept. of Commerce Record). During its existence, FDS was engaged
in sales and telemarketing activities. (Amd. Cpl. \\\\

3.

Lowry Aff \ 2).

In late 2001 or early 2002, an employee of FDS, Steve Bullpit, contacted Ted Thomas (President
of J&T Marketing) on behalf of FDS to explore the potential for a business relationship.
(Thomas Depo. p. 20-22).

4.

On January 31,2002, J&T Marketing entered into a "Sales and Marketing Agreement" with FDS
whereby J&T Marketing supplied FDS with the names, addresses and phone numbers of sales
leads and FDS marketed and sold Ted Thomas courses through telemarketing and other sales
efforts. (Amd. Cpl. \ 12, 28; Sales and Marketing Agreement; Lowry Aff. \ 12).

2
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5.

The Contract provided, among other things that FDS could enroll purchasers of Ted Thomas
courses in a program to provide coaching services for $99 per month. (Amd. Cpl. ^ 13; Sales
and Marketing Agreement).

6.

The Agreement allowed FDS to sell its coaching program and charge monthly on-going service
fees. (Thomas Aff. 12H). The Agreement also required Jones to pay FDS a "commission equal
to 60% of all gross sales made by Seller." (Id at f 5(a)(i)).

6.

Defendant Esbex.com was created in September 2000 by Defendants Lowry and Kinsella as a
product fulfillment company to fulfill product and service orders received through1 the sales and
telemarketing efforts of FDS and other telemarketing companies (Kinsella I Depo. 11:19-25;
Neubauer Depo. p. 43)

7.

Esbex.com was a DBA of FDS until June 2002, when it became Esbex.com, Inc., a Utah
corporation. (Amd. Cpl. f 7; Dept. of Chamber of Commerce Record). Esbex.com provided
coaching/mentoring services to purchasers of the Ted Thomas courses. (Amd. Cpl.fflf11, 14).
Esbex.com was dissolved on November 29,2004. (Dept. Of Commerce Record).

8.

Defendant John Neubauer is a former employee and the Chief Financial Officer and Chief
Operating Officer of FDS. From the time Mr. Neubauer took over responsibility for the finances
of FDS in February 2002 until he left a year later, FDS struggled and found it difficult to make
payroll for its approximately 40 employees. (Neubauer Depo. p. 16-17,40-41; Lowry Depo.
9:19-21).

9.

Neubauer was FDS's principal agent in dealing with J&T Marketing. All communications with
J&T Marketing came through Neubauer. He was FDS's point person and ran the business on a

3
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day-to-day basis. (Neubauer 16:19-21; Lukas Depo, p.17). Neubauer left FDS in early 2003.
(Kinsellal Depo. 18:1-2; Lowry Depo. 29:11-13).
Defendant Jeremy Warburton was a former employee of FDS and manager of FDS's
telemarketing department. In that position, Mr. Warburton helped coordinate FDS's sales and
marketing efforts, (Amd. Cpl.ffif3, 17; Lowry Aff. 17).
Defendants Lowry and Kinsella were the only two shareholders, officers, and directors of FDS
and Esbex.com, until those companies dissolved in 2004. (Amd. Cpl.ffif5-6; Kinsella I Depo.
8:10-15,11:19-25; Lowry Depo. pp. 17-18).
Esbex.com provided product fulfillment services for not only FDS, but also for other companies.
(Delia Kinsella Depo. II 9:11,15-20).
FDS experienced trouble using its Visa and MasterCard merchant accounts to clear money on
purchases. Because the credit card purchases were expensive and transacted over the phone, they
resulted in a large number of refunds and charge backs and, occasionally, frozen merchant
accounts. (Neubauer Depo. 18: 10-22).
FDS's problems with its merchant accounts culminated when a major merchant account
containing credit card charges for Plaintiffs Ted Thomas courses was frozen. (Neubauer 35:1125,39:22-25, 40:1-24; Lowry Aff4 13),
Plaintiff J&T Mailceting delayed or halted some shipments of its Ted Thomas courses for a
number of reasons, including: J&T Marketing would delay shipment of the product if payment
was delayed (Lukas Depo. 26:25-27:1, 63:10-22), J&T Marketing employed temporary shipping
clerks to assist with product shipment, which resulted in staff turnover and ongoing training and
4
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supervision issues. (Lukas Depo. pp. 65-73; Neubauer Depo. p. 34)
16.

J&T Marketing also ceased shipping its Ted Thomas courses due to the dispute over payment.
(Lowry Aff. Tf 13). Failure to receive the courses they had purchased with their credit cards
resulted in dissatisfied customers, and charge backs on FDS5s credit card merchant accounts.
(Neubauer 25:10-18, pp. 33-34, 93:11-17; Lowry Depo. p. 39-40).

17.

J&T Marketing withheld delivery on orders because FDS had not timely paid J&T Marketing.
FDS withheld payment to J&T Marketing because a percentage of its sales would not go through
resulting in charge backs. (Lowry Depo. 49:6-23; Thomas 263: 13-17).

18.

On or about July 19, 2002, FDS communicated to J&T Marketing that FDS believed that J&T
Marketing was in breach of the Sales and Marketing Agreement. (Lowry Aff. f 14). Lowry,
FDS's President, sent J&T Marketing the letter canceling the Agreement.

19.

On or about August 29,2002, J&T Marketing filed suit against FDS and several of its officers
and employees (Amd. Cpl.) and on or about November 15,2002 FDS filed a counterclaim.
(Answer, Counterclaim and Jury Demand 11/15/2002).

20.

J&T Marketing's Amended Complaint, dated June 17, 2004, alleges the folio wing, causes of
action:
a.

Breach of Contract against FDS for selling courses after the contract had been terminated.

b.

Theft by Conversion against Lowry, Kinsella, Neubauer and FDS by willfully interfering
with J&T Marketing's chattel.

c.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation against Lowry, Kinsella, Neubauer and FDS related to
FDS's performance of the contract.
5
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Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing against FDS

e.

Accounting against FDS.

f.

Injunctive Relief against Lowry, Kinsella, Warburton, FDS and Esbex.com to enjoin
them from future sales and marketing of the Ted Thomas courses.

g.

Constructive Fraud against Lowry, Kinsella, Warburton and FDS because they "shared a
confidential relationship based on their business activities" and "failed to disclose
material facts to J&T Marketing."

h.

Fraudulent Non-Disclosure against Lowry, Kinsella and FDS related to Defendants5
activities vis-a-vis Plaintiffs customers and clients.

L

Intentional Interference with Business Relations against Lowry, Kinsella and FDS for
interfering with Plaintiffs existing and potential economic relations with clients and sales
leads.

On or about November 3, 2004, FDS and Esbex.com determined that they were insolvent and
dissolved. (Lowry Aff f 18).
FDS and Esbex.com considered the coaching services to not be included under the Sales and
Marketing Agreement.
FDS received refunded Ted Thomas products, and turned around and shipped them out to its
customers. (Bankruptcy Depo 62:14-22; Oct. 18 Depo. 16:4-8).
The owners, Lowry and Kinsella took money out of the business. (Neubauer Bankruptcy Depo.
92:3-13).
Lowry and Kinsella determined the allocation of monies of FDS and Esbex. .(Banlc. Depo. 93:13-
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14,94:9-12.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendants move for summary judgment on J&T Marketing's second cause of action for
conversion, third cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, seventh cause of action for fraud,
eighth cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure, and ninth cause of action for intentional
interference with business relations.
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ, P. 56(c). The court is to view all the
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434,426 (Utah 1982). In opposing a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving elements of his or her cause of
action. "When a party fails to malce a sufficient showing of an element essential to the party's
case...there can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex
Corp v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986).
The Alter Ego Doctrine and Piercing the Corporate Veil
A corporation is a legal entity separate and apart from its shareholders. Dockstader v. Walker.
510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973); see also, Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc.,
789 P.2d 24,26 (Utah 1990). The limited liability afforded to shareholders permit them to malce capital
contributions to business enterprises without placing personal assets at risk. David H. Barber, Piercing
the Corporate Veil 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 371-373 (1981); accord Salt Lake City Corp. v. James

7
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Constructors, 761 P,2d 42, 46 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The alter ego doctrine is an exception to this rule. Shareholders can be personally liable if there
is "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individual no longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few individuals."
Colmanv. Column, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Additionally, the court must find that
observing the corporate form under such circumstances would "sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or
result in an inequity." Id.
Courts will "only reluctantly and cautiously pierce the corporate veil." Schafir v. Harrigan, 879
P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constr.. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42,
26 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). "A key feature of the alter ego theory is that it is an equitable doctrine
requiring that each case be determined upon its peculiar facts." Salt Lake City Corp., 761 P.2d 42,26
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); rquoting National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F.2d 1022, 1023
(8th Cir. 1965)). The Court should examine the following factors to determine whether there is such
unity of interest that the corporate veil should be pierced:
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3)
nonpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5)
nonfunctioning of other officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) the
use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud.
Colmanv. Colman, 743 P.2d 782,786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Many of Plaintiff s causes of action
against Defendants rest on the alter ego doctrine.
Defendants argue that there is no evidence in the record that would allow Plaintiff to pierce the
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corporate veil. Defendants were at all times acting in their corporate capacities and not personally.
Defendants also argue that many of Plaintiff s causes of action are really summed up in the breach of
contract claim, which would not implicate the Defendants personally. Limited liability to encourage
investment is the purpose of a corporation, and as noted, the corporate veil should be reluctantly pierced.
Plaintiff contends that there are material issues of fact in dispute as to whether FDS and
Esbex.com were merely the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff cites to the Neubauer depositions to
demonstrate that Kinsella and Lowry failed to observe corporate formalities, siphoned corporate funds
for personal use, and used the corporate entity to promote an injustice or fraud. Neubauer's bankruptcy
deposition has been stricken in its entirety, and is only reliable inasmuch as it is corroborated by the
October 18,-2005 deposition.
Plaintiffs citation to the Neubauer depositions does not create an issue as to a material fact as to
whether FDS and Esbex.com were the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff points to Neubauer's
statements regarding the decision to continue selling coaching, and to keep the money derived from
these sales. Neubauer testified that he understood proceeds from the coaching services to not be covered
under the Sales and Marketing Agreement, so that these funds were not supposed to be remitted to J&T
Marketing, whether it was before or after the cancellation of the Agreement (the timing of which is
unclear from the deposition). Plaintiffs claim is properly characterized as breach of contract based on
its interpretation of the contract, and does not implicate the Defendants personally.
Plaintiff cites to Neubauer's testimony that "FDS received refunded Ted Thomas products, and
turned around and shipped them out to its customers." While Neubauer testified that he would consult
with one of the Defendants before sending out these products, the statement is that FDS performed these

9
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activities. There is no indication that the Defendants were acting outside the scope of their positions
within the corporations.
While Neubauer states that Kinsella and Lowry took money from the businesses, he does not
state that it was done improperly. In fact, Neubauer states that he doesn't remember how the money was
taken out by Kinsella and Lowry, whether by official paycheck or otherwise. (Neubauer Oct. Depo. 40:314). He also testified that he did not have information with regards to whether the Defendants acted
fraudulently with respect to J&T Marketing, and that he thought FDS and Esbex.com were legitimate
companies. (Neubauer Oct Depo. 42:4-15). Significantly, Plaintiff acknowledges that it was Neubauer
who ran the day-to-day operations of the businesses and handled communication with J&T Marketing.
Without evidence to show that the Defendants acted in their personal capacity or took funds
improperly, Plaintiff cannot sustain its allegation of alter ego.
Conversion
Theft by conversion requires the "willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." State v.
Twitchell 832 P.2d 866,870 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The Defendants argue that there is no evidence in the record that they converted the property of
J&T Marketing to their own use. FDS allegedly failed to remit 40% of sales to J&T Marketing, but even
accepting this fact as true, it does not show the Defendants converted J&T Marketing property to
Defendants' personal use. Failure to remit is a claim for breach of contract, not conversion.
Plaintiff contends that FDS and Esbex.com were merely the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff
contends that Kinsella and Lowry failed to observe corporate formalities, siphoned corporate funds for
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.-•-

1694

personal use, and used the corporate entity to promote an injustice or fraud. The Court has already
decided that the alter ego doctrine does not apply to the acts of Defendants, and the corporate veil should
not be pierced. The Court grants Defendants motion for summary judgment as to the conversion claim.
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
In order to prove fraud, the Plaintiff must show (1) that a representation was made, (2)
concerning a presently existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which the representor knew to be
false or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, (6) that the other party,
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it, (8) and was thereby induced
to act, (9) to his injury and damage. Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co.. 56 P.3d 524, 536 (Utah 2002).
The Defendant argues that contractual promises are not statements of presently existing material
facts, unless a party makes those promises without any intent to perform.
The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants made fraudulent statements by inducing J&T Marketing
to enter into the contract with FDS without any intention to fully perform. Plaintiff contends that
Defendants misrepresented sales and refunds in weekly reconciliation reports and used Ted Thomas5
name after the Agreement had been canceled.
There is no evidence at the time of the contract the Defendants had a present intent not to
perform. Whether the Sales and Marketing Agreement entitled J&T Marketing to a percentage of the
sales from the coaching services is a question of contract interpretation. The Court has already found
that Plaintiff cannot pierce the corporate veil. Any misrepresentations as to weekly reconciliation reports
or regarding the volume and type of sales made, do not implicate the Defendants personally. There is
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also no evidence that either Defendant made statements of presently existing material facts that were
false.
One exception is Lowry's written statement that on termination of the contract "FDS would cease
selling Thomas's product and cease using Thomas's name and leads." There is evidence in the record
that FDS disregarded this representation completely. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
Plaintiff, the Court denies Defendant Lowry's motion for summary judgment as to this claim against
Lowry.
Constructive Fraud
Constructive fraud requires Plaintiff to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff
reposed trust in the Defendants based on an existing fiduciary relationship. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705
P.2d 766,770 (Utah 1985).

*

• •

Defendants argue that no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. Plaintiff contends
that FDS had confidential customer lists and that this is the basis for finding a confidential relationship.
As a matter of law, there was no confidential relationship between J&T Marketing and FDS
which extended to its officers and directors. Both businesses negotiated a commercial contract at arms
length. That contractual relationship did not grant to FDS the exclusive control over J&T Marketing's
interests that would give rise to a confidential relationship. See, Kulire v. Goodfellow. 69 P.3d 286, 291
(Utah 2003). Nothing in the record demonstrates that the Defendants as officers and directors were
responsible for failures to disclose.
Fraudulent Non-disclosure
A party alleging fraudulent non-disclosure must prove the following three elements, (1) the
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nondisclosed information was material, (2) the nondisclosed information is know to the party failing to
disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate. Hermansen v, Tasulis. 48 P.3d 235, 241-242
(Utah 2002).
The Plaintiff cites no case law supporting its argument that the Defendants had a legal duty to
speak. Absent a relationship that would give rise to this duty, Defendants did not have a duty to
communicate to Plaintiff. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the Defendants
should be personally liable under this cause of action.
Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations
Defendant argues that this is merely a restatement of J&T Marketing's claims for breach of
contract and fraud. There is no evidence that Defendants interfered with one of Plaintiff s current or
prospective business relationships.
Plaintiff argues that it was FDS that interfered with J&T Marketing's business relationships, but
that the corporate veil should be pierced.
Without piercing the corporate veil, this cause of action cannot implicate the Defendants
personally.
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PILED

Earl Jay Peck (2562)
Steven H. Stewart (3114)
R. Christopher Preston (9195)
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC
215 S. State Street, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 413-1600
Facsimile (801) 413-1620
Attorneys for Defendants
Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella

MAR 2 1 2006
" ^ ^ T H DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS
LOWRY'S AND KINSELLA'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES,
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN
NEUBAUER, JONATHAN L. LOWRY,
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX.COM,

Case No. 050100038
Division 9 - American Fork
Judge: Derek P. Pullan

Defendants.

Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella ("Defendants") submitted a Motion
for Summary Judgment on May 20, 2005. Oral arguments were heard by the above-entitled
Court on September 22, 2005, before the Honorable Derek P. Pullan, Fourth District Court
Judge. Defendants appeared and were represented by their attorney, Benjamin T. Wilson;
Plaintiff Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc., appeared and was represented by its attorney, Stephen
Quesenberry. On October 19, 2005, this Court issued its Order RE: Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment, permitting Plaintiff to take the deposition of John Neubauer and submit an
amended memorandum in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion. The deposition
of John Neubauer was held on October 18, 2005, and supplemental memoranda were submitted

4849-3834-0352.LO001.001

\
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

&U & d

[

)

by both parties. This Court having heard the arguments of counsel, having reviewed all the
memoranda of each party, being duly advised in the premises, with good cause appearing, issued
a Ruling Granting in Part Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment
filed on February 1, 2006 ("Ruling"), the entirety of which is hereby incorporated by reference.
Based upon the Undisputed Facts and the Conclusions of Law contained in the Ruling,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Second Cause of
Action (Theft by Conversion) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted.
2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action
(Fraudulent Misrepresentation) against Defendant Kinsella is granted.

Defendants'

motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action (Fraudulent
Misrepresentation) against Defendant Lowry is granted except as to Plaintiffs claim of
fraudulent misrepresentation based on Defendant Lowry's alleged written statement that
on termination of the contract "FDS would cease selling Thomas's product and cease
using Thomas's name and leads."
3. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of
Action (Constructive Fraud) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted.
4. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Eighth Cause of Action
(Fraudulent Non-Disclosure) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted.
5. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Ninth Cause of Action
(Intentional Interference with Business Relations) is granted..
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DATED this J?J_ day of March, 2006.
BYTHE

2-.day of March, 2006.

APPROVES AS TO FORM this _\_

StepKbiiQIxesehberry
J. Bryan Quesenberry
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the lO day of March, 2006,1 served upon the following a tme
and correct copy of the foregoing (proposed) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS LOWRY'S AND
KINSELLA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by causing the same to be
delivered by U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Stephen Quesenbeiry
J. Bryan Quesenbeiry
Jamestown Square
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Earl Jay Peck (2562)
fl^o/gS,
UTAH
R. Christopher Preston (9195)
COUNTY
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC
215 S. State Street, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 413-1600
Facsimile (801) 413-1620
Attorneys for Defendant
Jonathan L. Lowry
.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC.,
Plaintiff, .

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
JONATHAN L. LOWRY'S MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES,
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN
NEUBAUER., JONATHAN L. LOWRY,
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX.COM,

Case No. 050100038
Division 9 - American Fork
Judge: Howard Maetani

Defendants.
The individual Defendants Jonathan L. Lowy and Nathan Kinsella jointly moved for
Summary Judgment on the allegations of the Amended Complaint on May 20, 2005; the matter
was briefed and argued; and, in February 2006, the Court ruled, granting the motion completely
as to Defendant Kinsella and granting the motion partially as to Defendant Lowry, reserving
solely the issue of a claim for a specific alleged fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of Mr.
Lowry under the Third Cause of Action of the Amended Complaint. (The February 1, 2006
Ruling Granting in Part Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment is
referred to herein as "Ruling".)

The reservation went to only Mr. Lowry's alleged
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misrepresentation that "FDS would cease selling Thomas's (Plaintiffs) product and cease using
Thomas's name and Leads.'5
On October 9, 2007, Plaintiff appealed the February 2006 Ruling and the attendant Order
entered in March 2006, but Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the appeal in February 2008 on the
ground that the appeal had been taken before a final order had been entered, i.e., the remaining
issue of fraudulent misrepresentation had not been disposed of. Upon remand, the Court held a
scheduling conference on May 5, 2008, and a discussion was had at the conference among the
Court and counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant Lowry about the remaining issue. At the
conclusion of the conference the Court represented that the Court would exercise its discretion to
revisit the remaining issue on a Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly a briefing schedule
was established at the conference.
Subseguently, Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry, the only remaining individual Defendant,
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting memorandum and submissions dated
June 23, 2008, on the sole remaining issue. Plaintiff responded with its memorandum and
submissions on July 16, 2008. Defendant filed a reply memorandum on July 28,2008.
Defendant Jon Lowry's Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on
Friday August 22, 2008, at 1:30 p.m. Earl Jay Peck of the law firm of Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC,
appeared on behalf of Defendant Jon Lowry. Jessica Griffin Anderson of the law firm of Hill,
Johnson and Schmutz, LC appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs.
NOW THEREFORE, the Court having heard the arguments of counsel and considered
the respective memoranda and submissions, the Court finds, concludes and orders as follows:
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1.

The Court has exercised its discretion to re-examine the remaining claim of

fraudulent misrepresentation against individual Defendant Jonathan Lowry.
2.

The Court finds and concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show evidence of a

disputed material fact, z. e.9 that the alleged statement was made.
a.

As stated in its Ruling of February 1, 2006, "[i]n order to prove fraud, the

Plaintiff must show (1) that a representation was made, (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which the representor knew to be
false or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which
to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it, (8) and was thereby induced to act, (9) to his injury and damage. Prince
v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, If 41, 56 P.3d 524, 536.
b.

Mr. Lowry argues that he did not make the alleged representation. Plaintiff

argues that the contract contains a provision that upon termination FDS would
stop selling Plaintiffs product and cease using its name and leads.
c.

By its very nature a contractual promise to perform in the future is not a

statement of a presently existing material fact unless the promise is made with out
any intent to perform, that is, "a promise of future performance, when made with
a present intent not to perform and made to induce a party to act in reliance on
that promise, constitutes actionable deceit and fraud," Von Hake v. Thomas, 705
P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985).
d.

The Court finds and concludes that Plaintiff neither presented nor

proposed any evidence or argument that would allow a reasonable person to
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conclude that Mr. Lowry had no intent to perform the obligations in the contract
between the parties when he signed the contract between FDS and Plaintiff.
e.

Nothing was submitted to cause the Court to change its conclusion found

in the prior Ruling that "[t]here is no evidence at the time of the contract the
Defendants had a present intent not to perform. (Ruling at 11.) The Court
concludes, therefore, that as a matter of law the statements in the contract between
the parties do not satisfy the requirement that the alleged misrepresentation
purport to be a statement of a currently existing material fact.
f.

Plaintiff also argues that Mr. Lowry made the subject alleged

misrepresentation in a letter he signed and sent to Plaintiff dated July 19, 2002. In
the July 16, 2001, letter, however, Mr. Lowry does not state that "FDS would . ..
cease using Thomas's name and leads." (C./ Ruling at 12.) In the July 19, 2002,
letter Mr. Lowry does state that "We [FDS] are no longer selling any more Ted
Thomas product effective today." (Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of
Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry5s Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's.
Memorandum").)

As stated in Paragraph 2.c. above, in order for this

representation to support or satisfy the requirements of a misrepresentation of a
presently existing material fact, the statement would have had to have been made
with an intention on Mr. Lowry's part that FDS would not cease selling the Ted
Thomas product. As to this latter statement, Defendant Lowry states in his
declaration that he believed that his representation was true when he made it.
(Lowry Decl. at Para. 15-16.) Mr. Neubauer who was FDS's Chief Operating

2382
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Officer and Chief Financial Officer at the time states in his declaration that he had
received instructions from Mr. Lowry to cease selling Plaintiffs product effective
July 19,2002. (Neubauer Decl. at Paras. 8,13-14; Lowry Decl. at Paras. 13-16) .
g.

. The only claimed evidence of "no presently existing intent to perform" is

the argument put forth in Plaintiffs Memorandum that Mr. Lowry hid evidence of
sales of Ted Thomas product after the July 19th letter. (Plaintiffs Opposition to
Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs
Memorandum") at p. 12). This allegation is made in Plaintiffs Memorandum, but
is not supported by any submission. On the other hand, it is undisputed that Mr.
Lowry never rescinded this instruction not to sell Ted Thomas products.
(Neubauer Decl. at Para. 10.)
h.

The only remaining argument that Plaintiff makes in support of its

argument that a misrepresentation occurred is that by sending the July 19, 2002
letter, Mr. Lowry intended to terminate the contract and by terminating the
contract he was in effect representing what FDS would do upon termination, as
stated in the contract between the parties. The Court rejects this argument and
finds that Plaintiff has submitted nothing that would directly or by implication
refute Defendant's submissions which contained sworn statements that he fully
intended that FDS would cease selling Ted Thomas products when he sent his
letter of July 19, 2002. The Court concludes that the July 19, 2002 letter does not
constitute a current representation that the termination terms would all be
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complied with and does not satisfy the element that there be a misrepresentation
of a currently existing material fact
3.

Defendant Lowry also argues that he is entitled to Summary Judgment on the

ground that Amended Complaint fails to plead the essential elements of fraud. In this regard the
Court finds and concludes that:
SL

The Amended Complaint makes no allegation that, and no submission is

offered by Plaintiff that, would support a finding that Plaintiff was induced to rely
upon the alleged misrepresentation. This is particularly important because given
the nature and content of the alleged misrepresentation as well as the
circumstances under which it was alleged to have been made it is difficult to
imagine how7 reliance could have been induced. Thus, the context in which the
..

alleged misrepresentation was allegedly- made does not either infer reliance or
allow for a finding of implied reliance. Utah courts hold that "mere conclusory
allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding
facts, are insufficient to preclude...summary judgment." Franco v. Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, \ 36, 21 P.3d 198. In the instant
case, Plaintiff has failed both to allege induced reliance and failed to offer
evidence by submission that would support afindingof induced reliance.
b.

Similarly, and for the same reasons set forth above in Para. 3.a above, the

Court finds and concludes that the Amended Complaint fails to contain
allegations, and Plaintiff fails to otherwise support the necessary element that its
- reliance on the representation was reasonable.
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c.

Finally, Plaintiff fails to allege the essential element of damages.

Paragraph 52 of the Amended Complaint contains the allegation that "Defendants5
fraudulent conduct has injured Plaintiff in an amount no less that $100,000 by
withholding from [Plaintiff] its contractual percent of compensation, by ruining
[Plaintiffs] reputation and relationship with its clients, by continuing to use
[Plaintiffs] name, Product, leads, etc., by continuing to associate itself with
[Plaintiff] and Thomas, and in other ways." This allegation of damages, however,
does not describe damages of the type and nature that one could infer would flow
from the alleged fraudulent representation here. On the contrary, the referenced
damages appear to be contract damages or damages related to some other cause of
action. Again the decision in the Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, is applicable: "mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a
recitation of relevant -surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude...summary
judgment." 2001 UT 25 at If 36
4.

All of the foregoing must be examined in light of the burden of proof that a. fraud

claimant faces. "As a general rule, fraud is not presumed. When it is alleged, each element of
fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence." 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit,
Section 471. "For the evidence to be clear and convincing, it must at least have reached the point
where there remains no substantial doubt as to the truth or correctness of the conclusion based
upon the evidence." (MUJI2.19.) In other words, as to the burden to show induced reliance, z. e.,
that the Defendant made the representation for the purpose of causing the plaintiff to take some
action, or causing the Plaintiff not to act, Plaintiff would have to show that there is no substantial
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doubt as to the truth or correctness of the allegation of induced reliance. The Court finds and
concludes that based upon the parties' submissions to the Court that reasonable minds could not
reasonably conclude that Plaintiff would be able to establish any of the elements of fraud in this
case by clear and convincing evidence.
5.

For the foregoing reasons and the additional reasons set forth in Defendant's

Memoranda,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for complete Summary Judgment is
hereby granted in favor of Defendant Jonathan L. Lowry on the Third Cause of Action of the
Amended Complaint; the Court hereby modifies and amends any previously entered judgment or
ruling herein which is inconsistent with .the findings and conclusions hereinabove; and,
Defendant Jonathan Lowry is awarded his costs.
DATED this 6^fd'ay of September, 2008

IowaidMaulaui—•
APPROVED AS TO F O R M ^ f e ^

Stephen Quesenberry
Jessica Qriffin Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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